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Abstract: The meteoric change of global environment in today’s world can be understood at least in two 
contexts; symbolic and real, understanding it from the Lacanian point of view. The symbolic constructs a 
structure wherein human beings as subjects are subjectivized under a disguised hallucination of imagination. 
In addition, the real is that what the symbolic has lost in its very inauguration and therefore keeps desiring. 
When the symbolic comes to confront the real, i.e. when, for example, a global capitalistic structure faces a 
lurking nature which is now anti-posed against the symbolic itself due to its exploitive mentality of nature the 
subject becomes a paranoiac subject. Can a paranoiac subject exercise a real agency and thus recover her 
freedom without being a schizophrenic? In this paper, I want to discuss these issues from a psychoanalytic as 
well as philosophical point of view. 
 




Let me start with the question of human agency? Oxford Dictionary of Critical Theory defines agency as 
“the degree to which a subject is able to determine the course of their own actions”1. Therefore, it is agency 
that saves the subject in a way from being a mere automaton. That is, a subject is a subject because she is an 
agent. However, a subject is also a subjectivized subject in the sense that she comes under the grip of 
hallucinatory imagination constructed by the ideology of culture. And, that is why human being can be called 
a subject, that she is a subject of a structure of the culture, for a subject cannot live alone; she must conform to 
the inter-subjective symbolic or language devised by the culture.2 The fact is what the symbolic or the 
language of the culture does is but to try to arrest the real of nature through the metaphoric expression of 
significance.3 This is the reason there must be the signifier that oscillates between the presence and absence 
before it is significantly captured by the imaginary of the inter-subjective – presence in the sense of the 
definite referent of sharable imagination in the symbolic-imaginary reality and absence in terms of 
indefinable and indefinite real against and beyond that very reality of the culture. That also establishes that 
the subject is split between the real and reality, or nature and culture, or signifier and signified, or 
unconscious or conscious, to speak of it from the Lacanian perspective of Freudian Psychoanalysis. Then, how 
can agency of the subject who is split be understood?   
 
In fact, this splitness of the subject becomes prominent with the meteoric change of global environment. This 
change can be understood in the symbolic as well as the real as it can be thought at best by a finite human 
mind. How the symbolic has started, one can ask. It starts with the very inauguration of the social, the 
culture.4 For example, I would like to talk of exchanging of materials as it can be regarded as one of the bases 
of social beginning looking at the inter-subjective plan of the human society. Exchange in itself is a form, for it 
can be a gift or a symbol. In addition, what is exchanged is the content. The content may be anything as the 
form can differ. For example, we may surmise that Christianity started with an exchange in the name of a 
sacrifice. The history of human being reveals the fact that whatever can be considered as the most precious 
can be taken as the content of exchange. In this way, forms give rise to cultural taboos and norms.  Thus, from 
the human being herself (remember the slavery in the West until recent times, or offering bribes or dowry in 
India, or offering the daughter of the defeated king to the victor king) to minute things anything could have 
been regarded as contents. At the present time, content has been associated with the process of 
contextualization and things have been crazy and complex comparing to the earlier age. The content becomes 
larger and stronger and it cannot fit to the form any more, for a form can remain a form only when human can 
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control it in the present context. As for instance, money as content has become contentualized under a global 
system. When the process of exchange started in a mythical time5, contents could fit to the form, i.e. the 
exchange itself. Now contentualization becomes itself a form. How can a form fit itself to another form? Thus 
we require a process of formalization, may be in the name of politics or ethics.  
 
I will call contentualization hallucinatory, because it covers the relative truths under a big carpet of structure 
insisting that only this structure can be the way of living a life. However, it is not the universal fact; it is just an 
effort in terms of a universalization that tries to substantialize contentualization in the name of a form as a 
surface ideological reality destroying the virtuality of other symbolic forms, which could also have been a way 
of living a life. For example, under the process of contentualization, the process of exchange itself was 
exchanged in terms of capitals or monetary system. This paves the way to further contentualizations as for 
instance, what is happening today is that that exchange of exchange is being exchanged again by something – 
by a virtual space like internet. In addition, more this process of exchange is going on greater human is being 
reduced to something – something that is neither human nor non-human. Human being thus is becoming a 
taboo itself. Is it a fact city of being a human? In fact, contentualization can be compared to the process of 
signification of the signifier in which case a signifier can be taken as a form. In addition, why not, “(For) the 
signifier is a unique unit of being which, by its very nature, the symbol is of but an absence.”6  And when any 
symbolic action once performed by human being itself turns out to devour her subjectivity, i.e. when a 
contentualization itself tries to determine what the formalization should be, in a way, if the signification tries 
to arrest the signifier; the form, the signifier revolts and tries to escape from the signification. In addition, 
“what remains of a signifier when it no longer has any signification … (is) marked by blindness.”7 As Lacan 
says, “Such is the signifier’s answer, beyond all significations: “You believe you are taking action when I am 
the one making you stir at the bidding of the bonds with which I weave your desires…that the signifier’s 
answer to whomever questions it is: Eat your Dasein (i.e. being).”8 
 
The global capitalism with its immanent strategy of using yet another artificial space reducing human being 
to mere subjectivized subjects is doing just only that, that by its inherent contentualization itself it is trying to 
determine what the formalization should be and this is the way human being has come to see the real of the 
nature once she imaginarily envisioned of capturing by the metaphoric substitution of the signifier. It is the 
global capitalistic structure that hankers after only profit and thus is incessantly exploiting the natural 
resources that indirectly offers human being the analytic cushion9 where something is going to “eat” her 
subjectivity, that, phenomenon like global warming or tsunami would eventually bring about sheer 
destruction. This unimaginable real is then only an effect of her cultural symbolic. The subject in fact is not 
bothered about the real at all.  
 
Agency of human being, then, can be understood in retroaction done by the subject and in three ways –  
 In the realization in an action performed by a subject who is subjectivized, 
 In the realization in an acting out of a projected action by a subject who has already seen the 
predicament of her subjectivization, but committed to the Culture anyway. 
 In the realization in an eventual Act10 done by a subject. 
 
Coming to freedom. In accordance with the agency realized in three ways, freedom also can be thought of in 
three ways. For the first type freedom can be defined as the mediation between subjectivity and agency, as a 
subjectivized subject would like to think it to be. It is mediation in the sense that the subject thinks she gets a 
feeling of being an agent through it. However, in fact, it is only an imaginary freedom - a freedom that can 
seduce a subjectivized subject beyond measures. Therefore, we can say, actually, there is always a distance 
between agency and freedom in this case as the agent cannot recognize it due to the imaginary hallucination.  
 
Thus the subject gradually gets subjectivized more and more in the network of cultural reality, thanks to 
language. The more she gets subjectivized the greater she loses her sense of real freedom that she could have 
achieved according to her own ontological nature. In place of real freedom she then develops the sense of an 
artificial imaginary-symbolic freedom and she thinks she has it when she speaks, thinks, or takes a decision. 
This is a trap because it is devised by the culture and being a subjectivized subject the subject has to 
internalize it in order to have a sense of freedom and agency. It – being with the superegoic ideal set by the 
culture – has to be internalized because only there is set the phenomenon of (artificial) ‘human development’. 
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Thus, this subject also keeps holding the status of being some agent somehow because only in this type of 
‘development’ she runs the ‘vehicle’ of the culture. Therefore, the subject has no freedom in fact, though she 
may think she has it when she does something (which is, therefore, not doing but performing). Therefore, her 
agency which is based on an artificial freedom is hallucinatory from the philosophical point of view to 
comment on, and, thus she merely performs as a performer a role who (does not do anything herself but) is 
done under the dictation of the capitalistic cultural director. 
 
Let me then reflect on the freedom that is realized in the second kind of agency. One of the exemplifications of 
this kind of agency can be found probably in the so-called middle class people in today’s world of global 
capitalism. On the one hand, these people get that much of opportunity and success that they could also feel 
deprived of more benefits and pleasures that can always be imaginarily envisaged. In a way they feel deprived 
because they can reflect and they can reflect because they get something. Therefore these people’s reflection 
occurs due to an objectified pleasure oriented formula devised by the society driven by the ideology of 
capitalism. On the other hand, they may also understand that they may be living in the end-time, as Zizek has 
argued, and thus they can think of staying out of this earth when they face a catastrophe like global warming, 
but they cannot find out a solution to the problem a universal capitalism may create – a problem which 
indirectly of course adds to the global warming.11 These people therefore becoming subjectivized always by 
the culture can only whimsically imagine of an alternative to the earth when they confront a real problem 
whereas cannot devise a symbolic substitution of the world they have prepared for themselves.  To get rid of 
the paranoia in terms of real they can only escape from their responsibility and thus become paranoiac 
subjects. This subject then shits where she eats, and, thereby, she says that she cannot clean up this abject12 
garbage. This happens to every kind of middle class subject – a middle class subject who suffers from the 
repose and leisure of being in the middle class and thereby deviated, and, she always tries to escape from this 
predicament although she can do it only by committing to this agency. As a consequence the subject becomes 
a paranoiac subject. She gets repose and leisure in the sense of the comfort she enjoys while sitting on the 
pendulous swing and doing nothing i.e. she thinks that she is driving her carrier and creating the momentum 
whereas she is in fact made to imagine like that by the repetitive formalization of the very swinging itself. We 
must understand, hence, that a middle class subject does not only contain the economic measurement, for she 
should be taken also as having socio-political, physico-psychological, ethno-cultural, or geographico-regional 
assessment. For example, a Freudian physico-psychological paranoiac oscillates between the measurement of 
unconscious and (pre)conscious and thus becomes a subject who struggles against these culturally devised 
theses in an effort of the recovery of subjectivity.  
 
Alternatively, for example, a paranoiac subject may have an identity problem regarding the totem and taboo 
she is inclined to ethnically when and where an ideological cultural universalism in terms of a global 
citizenship is imposed on her own understanding of subjectivity.  So, she finds herself in a situation where she 
cannot hold either to a relativistic position, for that does not support the investment of her traditional capital 
which is thoroughly rejected as a superstition or she has any other way to survival in a world where she has 
to fight back even for her prior existence she has lost under the cultural mask she is offered now when she 
wears. This is also the story of the Freudian paranoiac subject who in the search of her subjectivity eventually 
takes up an extreme position out of frustration ends up with a following of a contingent geography of the 
human subjectivity – a geography that has been forcefully drawn by her submission to a rationality whose 
method is only to objectify over a region of chaos where no mapping can actually be possible. That also 
advocates of an ideological pleasure in terms of a mask the subject wears that conceals any diabolical crime 
committed by her in a struggle of survival against any other outside of that very ideological identity, as she 
marks herself within a boundary by that mask separating her from what she in fact cannot cut herself off.  
However by committing to that kind of a crime the subject cannot remain calm without having a question as 
she does have the question being in a confrontation with the very relativism itself. That is why she has often 
to take recourse in an escapism in terms of a forgetfulness of responsibility. Her subjectivity dwindles 
between an oscillation of sudden reaction to any social activity, taking part in it with a relativistic attitude 
where freedom is set with a target from freedom from to freedom to, and, then forget the whole reaction in the 
lap of a formal action she is culturally subjectivized to in terms of a paranoia. In a way, she often resorts to 
nihilism that is why, with the frustration that remains (since it is a formality) despite her keen effort to 
recover from it. The mask of universalism under the influence of capitalistic ideology gets revealed here 
simply by the relativism but the very relativism also sustains its very nature of relativism qua relativism only 
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because there could be an extreme universalism. It is but a simple formal trap, a paradoxical confrontation 
with life where the subject loses her true mission.  
 
Thus she also becomes a socio-political victim who knows that she is being victimized; in order to save the 
society she looks forward to a political life which is in fact already set for her before her arrival and then thus 
in order to save the politics itself she becomes a vagabond in search of a true social commitment among her 
fellow beings. And in this job of symbolic itinerary the subject even loses her ethical dream once upon a time 
being influenced by the signifier and thus got purloined by the intersubjective game of group psychology13; 
and the subject gets stuck by the web between individualism and the group, or the ego and the cultural 
(super) ego and thereby unable to recognize that her subjectivity was apart from this (super) egoistic 
groupism or cultural conglomeration. As Freud has beautifully summarizes the predicament of the subject, 
“In him (the subject) when tension arises, it is only the aggressiveness of the superego which, in the form of 
reproaches, makes itself noisily heard; its actual demands often remain unconscious in the background. If we 
bring them to conscious knowledge, we find that they coincide with the precepts of the prevailing cultural 
super-ego. At this point the two processes that of the cultural development of the group and that of the 
cultural development of the individual, are, as it were, always interlocked. The cultural super-ego has 
developed its ideals and set up its demands. Among the latter, those, which deal with the relations of human 
beings to one another, are compromised under the heading of ethics. People have at all times set the greatest 
value on ethics (i.e. cultural morality); as though they expected that it in particular would produce especially 
important results. In addition, it does in fact deal with a subject, which can easily be recognized as the sorest 
spot in every civilization. Ethics is thus to be regarded as a therapeutic attempt – as an endeavour to achieve, 
by means of a command of the super-ego, something, which has so far not been achieved by means of any 
other cultural activities. As we already know, the problem before us is how to get rid of the greatest 
hindrance to civilization – namely, the constitutional inclination of human beings to be aggressive towards 
one another; and for that very reason we are especially interested in what is probably the most recent of the 
cultural commands of the super-ego, the commandment to love one’s neighbor as oneself. In our research 
into, and therapy of, a neurosis, we are led to make two reproaches against the super-ego of the individual. In 
the severity of its commands and prohibitions it troubles itself too little about the happiness of the ego, in that 
it takes insufficient account of the resistances against obeying them – of the instinctual strength of the id [in 
the first place], and of the difficulties presented by the real external environment [in the second].” 14 
 
A paranoiac subject thus herself gets entrapped of the vacillation between an inescapable predicament of 
objectification of subjectivization (from the third person perspective of cultural super-ego) and then 
subjectification (first person perspective of egoistic anxiety) of that objectification of human subjectivity. It is 
in the sense that, against the sublime transcendent Ethics that can do justice to nature, the subject at first 
metaphysically establishes cultural morality which can be called the objectification of subjectivization, as the 
subject objectifies her predicament in terms of values and taboos; and then she also subjectifies i.e. introjects 
in her subjectivity that very objectification. A paranoiac subject in fact must oscillate between subjectiviza-
tion and subjectifica-tion (it is a tion – a formal institutionalization due to the imagination that revolves round 
the ego as the ego’s imaginary, hence the subject cannot be said to have done it though she is responsible of 
the relationship she has with her ego), because she must perform the role of the analyzed (of the society) and 
commit at the same time to the (cultural) analyst (of the institution/ideology/signifier). Thus, she will be a 
victim of the endless process of (finding) freedom. Due to paranoia she suffers from, the subject must move 
from the one point to the other by trying to escape, and, thanks to narcissistic hallucination, she would 
remain performing an analyzed for a period of time being posed in a third person’s role until and unless she 
gets verified and disposed of her contentualization, and, thanks to her previous home which is now occupied 
with new contents, she thus takes recourse back into the former formalization. She would be continuing this 
repetition automatism till she gets an opportunity in an eventual moment to look at herself and then come 
out of this kraal circle of culture.    
 
Freedom, therefore, for this type of agency must be a metaphorical one. However, seeking freedom thus in a 
relativization via a formal structure is not a new story for the subject. In fact, the subject starts living it with 
the very inauguration of the subjectivity itself. We can understand it from the Freudian story of fort-da game. 
The subject replaces her Desire by a substitution and inaugurates a formal play upon the repression of her 
true nature and thereby feeling free in that metaphorical transformation of subjectivity. Therefore, freedom 
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comes as the fort-da, as an oscillation, as a form, a normativity by which culture encroaches upon the 
subjectivity blocking or making unimportant with the help of repression the other possible ways of being 
rather than the cultural superegoic values or standardized norms. The question is, how can the subject get rid 
of this cultural fact city when even a primal scene can be interpreted as a metaphorical one, i.e. when even the 
first human cry can be considered as the first installing of the subject into a network of signifiers when and 
where the signifier saves as well as shapes the neonate’s subjectivity from the sudden trauma of birth and 
hence of utmost helplessness with the metaphorical substitution of a cry. In fact, this is the primal metaphoric 
scene that paves the way for the subject as a lost subject in the future of a cultural temporality, talking of it 
from the point of a retroactive reflection a paranoiac subject can transcendentally deem. It also installs the 
subject in such a way in the cultural spatiality that the subject would find her identity hereafter only as posed; 
or disposed in accordance with the imposition of time, and, she comes out of a complete subjectivized status 
of hallucinatory agency if only she can find a repose during her continuous oscillation. This is the fact city that 
can be understood in terms of a paranoia always running after the subject and that propels her to continue 
her journey. The paranoiac subject is never satisfied due to this privation, for she can tell herself only that “I 
ran at par excellence but did not act anything” (Paranoiac: par-ran-no-I-ac (t)). Therefore, the paranoiac 
engages herself in a do or die situation, the death is possible only with the schizophrenic agency that tears 
apart the symbolic culture, this subject suffers from the paranoia tout court; she is afraid of dying in fact. 
 
We can, thereby, also say that paradoxically this freedom is a means, not an end that looks for a permanent 
goal – a goal that can be achieved only by a schizophrenic agency in a no man’s land when and where 
subjectivity can be recovered once again in its genuine form. In addition, the paranoiac subject would remain 
struggling with this confusion of a means or end; trying to decide again and again which one can be the 
proper way to freedom. This is a formal trap; and most of us, who are actually paranoiac subjects, struggle 
against this formality, may be, as for example, committing to an ideological motto what we think is a better 
symbolic than a previous oppressive one. Are we not becoming just paranoiac being afraid of the catastrophic 
global change? In fact, the real running through (the flesh and blood of) the subject surreptitiously always 
wants to stop this idealism – an idealism that palpably establishes itself in terms of a symbolc-maginary 
reality – an idealism where the subject oscillates between inferiority and superiority complex due to the 
paranoia she suffers from in respect with her effort to get a freedom from a freedom to. So, the fact is, this also 
means that the potential nature that all the time talks of a realism that tries to stop any quali-quantification of 
freedom, hence the culture; and, this indirectly provides a clue as if the subject gets an opportunity to be a 
real subject and thus be free somehow. The question is how the subject then would go for it? The question of 
‘how’ can be realized in the fact that a real freedom which is realized in an Act of schizophrenic15 agency does 
not have any quali-quantification. It is beyond categories, thoughts, imagination, or objectification. It is both 
a-spatial and a-temporal from the point of the immanence. It is trans-spatio-temporal from the point of the 
transcendent. Hence though it can be said that there is a zone of real freedom where the subjectivity of the 
subject is fully recovered  she in fact cannot either envisage or realize that she has got an opportunity until 
and unless she is under the supervision of cultural traits of measuring things with quali-quantification or 
spatio-temporality.  
 
Moreover, there is no distance to it from the agency since having It means the recovery of the subjectivity and 
executing the agency altogether. Therefore, the question of any ‘how’, in fact does not arise here. Because, 
from the cultural point of view it is an impossible and unthinkable zone even if the subject could ever achieve 
it. However, however, still It is there, theoretically speaking, that makes the subject a real subject, for on the 
very ground against It only the formula of a paranoiac freedom and agency can be envisaged. It is there 
because there cannot only be idealism but there must also be realism that saves the subject from the 
universal reverie of the culture. It is, to speak of it then within the periphery of a cultural language, the 
unthinkable or the unimaginable in the sense that it is either too simple or too complex to be thought of under 
the cultural categorization. Therefore, it just occurs as it must be there in the subjectivity. It brings in or 
evokes a zone in the subject, which is neither human nor non-human, but simply a-human, which in any case 
does not mean to be a cultural category of anti-human. It makes a subject singular in the truest sense in terms 
of the furthest possible imagination the culture may have, in the sense that it is neither cultural nor natural, 
neither bound by a (super)egoic (pre)conscious nor any unconscious id. So, subjectivity is celebrated in its 
fullest form, say, to gauge it in a maximum possible way of expression within the culture as it can be thought 
by a paranoiac subject in her schizophrenic meditation of the real nature. And thus it can also be easily 
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understood how a subject entrapped by the cultural seduction would suffer paranoiac agency, understood in 
a defenseless manner but not any longer paralyzed16 because it is after all an agency, in three ways of her 
committed actions in search of freedom – a freedom Freud himself was looking for as a paranoiac subject – 
when the subject would always require a symbolic god in a fatherly manner i.e. in the style of a task the 
(super) egoic (pre)conscious of the culture devises – by exorcising the terrors of nature (real real), by 
reconciling to the cruelty of fate in terms of death (imaginary real), and by compensating for the sufferings and 
privations which a civilized life in common imposes on the subject (symbolic real).17  
 
The ontology where nature breathes, where other creatures as well as non creatures live beyond the 
anthropocentric imagination of culture cannot be captured by a freedom capitalistic imagination may 
indirectly advocate to. In a way, this kind of theory does not advocate of a freedom of a human subject in 
terms of the capacity of rationality to comment on and capture the human fact city. However, it, then, remains 
only at the level of thought – the thought what seeks to rationalize feelings or intuitions. In fact, it can easily 
be argued that once the subject acquires the necessary development to adjust with the pressure of both 
nature and culture she can be free. Sublimity or a real freedom is always transcendent, a surplus beyond 
subjectivization. In addition to this, the paranoiac nature of human subjectivized predicament will always 
make the subject suffer from or toil over ways of living that get changed again and again under the influence 
of objectification in search of such a kind of objectified freedom that ironically enough can be found only in a 
ridiculous balance. Can the human subject who must oscillate between hallucination and paranoia under the 
fact city of subjectivization ever be balanced to be free being within that very subjectivizaion? That is also the 
reason that even though a subject takes up an a-humanistic stance being within the condition of 
subjectivization it cannot be summed up that she could achieve freedom as such as that stance is out of 
frustration, for it may turn out to be actually not a-humanistic but de-humanistic. She, the subject taking 
recourse in this stance, therefore, cannot ever be joyful in a real sense, for she can only resort to an escapism 
fleeing away from her responsibility by committing to that. In search of ‘development’ of civilization, then, 
this subject only resorts to a de-eve-(of)-elopement, that is, at the adjoining point of her continuous 
oscillation between day and night where the subject could have found out her subjectivity, at the moment of 
discovering the singularity of subjectivity in an evening the subject puts on a de to distort her decision of 
taking up responsibility. Therefore, a maintenance of balance and thereby freedom of a middle way under the 
influence of symbolic gets deviated. And, thus, the subject remains sunk in an ignorance paying a deaf ear to 
her greatest responsibility to come to her true being, to be her own self, or to recover her subjectivity and 
thereby freedom from her own subjectification first. 
 
Coming back to the subject, the subject becomes somebody like a lover of forbidden love when she achieves 
the aesthetic mode (of accident, of intermingling that what cannot be normally intermingled). From a 
mundane symbolic point of view, a lover who loves another of what the culture cannot permit is recognized 
as made and therefore schizophrenic by the inter-subjective point of judgment. However, exercising that 
impossibility the lover spreads the dangerous message that anybody can (be in) love. In addition, this fact 
that anybody can be in love with anybody cannot be entertained by the normativity of the capitalistic culture. 
By her eventual act of executing love the subject of course gives a shock to the symbolic and teaches an ethics 
to the inter-subjective world – an ethics which is repressed by the culture under the veil of superficial 
morality which can easily be politicized by the hegemonic seduction of hallucinatory ideology. 
  
2. Does the capitalistic culture offer any opportunities to the subject to be a real agent? 
 
So far a subject of paranoiac agency can envisage being in a position to say something of it, I want to say that 
it can be categorized at least in three ways. There may be a point where two contradictory currents of the 
culture meet each other. Often ambushes and chaos occur due to this type of confrontation. Though this 
contradiction happens to be symbolic-imaginary, the consequence this clash leaves behind is a real one. Then, 
there arises an opportunity of making a boundary – and a no man’s land thus also usurps. The subject in that 
place can see both the currents from a proper distance in an appropriate time. For example, we can think of 
the ethnic clash with capitalism where the subject can rediscover herself out of a loss of falling between a 
superstitious native normativity and a seductive modern leisure and comfort as soon as she feels that she can 
belong to neither of them. There may be another point where the superficiality of culture gets exposed due to 
the competition two contrary cultural trends set for themselves. If the first one, i.e. the contradiction is inter-
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cultural clash then this one is an intra-cultural problem when and where the subject gets a tans-cultural 
transcendent vision. For example, we can think of the clash between the Hindus and the Muslims or any 
identity struggles between a tribe and a mainstream identity. Politicization in terms of ideological differences 
plays a major role in this type of clashes and the subject gets opportunities to become a political subject here. 
The fact is that these contrary cultural trends can very well co-exist if not influenced by the former 
contradictory one.  
 
There is another bigger clash. The culture itself confronts the nature. It happens when the culture either 
directly encounters the natural Nakedness face to face or, indirectly, tries to imitate the nature or creates a 
kind of virtual nature running parallel to the real nature, which threatens the nature in some way around. 
This clash is understood by the subject when and where she finds a cultural abutment beyond the cultural 
anthropocentricism. In addition, when we are talking of a real meteoric global change we are discussing 
nothing but only this. The first one comes to the subject as a symbolic real, the second one gets along as an 
imaginary real, and, the third happens as the real. In fact, these intra-cultural clashes, or inter-cultural-
conflicts, or the trans-cultural-combat whatever are possible to be delineated in a rational understanding in 
terms of the three hegemonic universals Zizek talks of apropos of the Lacanian order of imaginary, symbolic, 
and real respectively. The subject standing in the subjective stand of polar particularity against the 
universality of these hegemonic forces can get the opportunity of being a singular subject through these 
battles. The subject can use these opportunities without losing her subject-hood because as the universal they 
can in fact always be relativized in the imaginary of the subject in a way. However, a universal can hold the 
status of the universal if it is celebrated as such in a plane of inter-subjectivity. In Freudian way to talk of it, 
universals are universals because they are fetish for the subject and shared as a taboo, for only then they can 
be predicated to many particulars at the same time when they earn a sacred symbolic place in the subject’s 
imagination. And this is the way the ‘impasses’ that demonstrate how the complex structure of the universal 
is created  should also be understood – that ‘the ‘real’ universality of globalization’ is confronting the nature 
in an combative encounter, ‘the universality of the fiction that regulates ideological hegemony is conflicting 
with another hegemonic current of ideology’ (as for example Church and State got into a contrary conflict 
during a period of enlightenment), or ‘the universality of an Ideal, as exemplified by the revolutionary 
demand for egaliberte’ (personified in a Freudian image of a boyfriend or girlfriend as revealed in the era of 
hallucinatory feminism that re-establishes patriarchy masochistically in a paradoxical manner) is battling in 
an intra-cultural clash (as revealed in the event of honor-killing, or, anti-caste marriage, etc. in India).18 It is 
up to the subject then whether she would be a lover, a schizophrenic to search for an alternative symbolic 
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4 According to Lacan it is a corruption against the unity of nature. See Ibid. pp. 58-76. 
5  When the human culture just started. 
6 Lacan, J. (2006). Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English. Trans.  By Bruce Fink. New York and London: 
W. W. Norton & Company. p.17. 
7  Ibid, p.28 
8 Ibid. p.29 
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the instruction given to him by the analyst. Many a time, therefore, a serious mistake is committed, 
that the analyst himself imposes his thoughts upon the subject’s unconscious and the subject tries to 
imagine that as if it is actually her memories. See Ibid. pp.197-268. 
10  Act is a noun and at the same time a verb. We can say that this is the indecisiveness, the impossibility the 
Culture cannot capture of an Act, that Act is as a noun static, signified, metaphysical, imaginary but as 
a verb dynamic, signifier(Ed), ontological, symbolic. 
11   Zizek, S.  (2010). Living in the End Times. London: Verso. p. 10. 
12 “That which disturbs the self, by provoking either disgust, fear, loathing or repulsion. Belonging to the 
realm of the psychic, the abject is the excessive dimension of either a subject or an object that cannot 
be assimilated. As such, it is simultaneously outside or beyond the subject and inside and of the 
subject. Our own bodily fluids are for the most part loathsome to us, but the intensity of that loathing 
owes precisely to the fact that they come from us. Thus human faces are more disgusting to us than 
dog faces, despite the fact that there is no real difference between them.”  
      Buchanan, I. (2010). Dictionary of Critical Theory. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. p.1. 
13  Lacan, J. (2006). Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English. Trans.  By Bruce Fink. New York and 
London: W. W. Norton & Company. pp. 20-21. 
14  Freud, S. (2003). Civilization, Society and Religion, Book No. 12. New Delhi: Shrijee’s Book International. 
pp. 353-354. 
15 I am taking schizophrenia in the Deleuzian sense of schizoanalysis. See Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2005). 
Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. London and New York:  Continuum. 
16  “…(I)f everywhere in nature there are Beings around us of a kind that we know in our own society, then we 
can breathe freely, can feel at home in the uncanny and can deal by psychical means with our 
senseless anxiety. We are still defenseless, perhaps, but we are no longer helplessly paralyzed; we 
can at least react.”  
      Freud, S. (2003). Civilization, Society and Religion, Book No.12. New Delhi: Shrijee’s Book International. 
p.204. 
17 “… (B) ut he (the subject) gives them the character of a father. He turns them into gods, In the course of 
time the first observations were made of regularity and conformity to law in natural phenomena, and 
with this, the forces of nature lost their human traits. However, man’s helplessness remains and 
along with it his longing for his father, and the gods. The gods retain their threefold task: they must 
exorcize the terrors of nature, they must reconcile men to the cruelty of Fate, particularly as it is 
shown in death, and they must compensate them for the sufferings and privations which a civilized 
life in common has imposed on them.”  
      Freud, S. (2003). Civilization, Society and Religion, Book No.12. New Delhi: Shrijee’s Book International. 
p.205. 
18 Zizek, S. (2007). The Ticklish Subject, The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. New Delhi: ABS Publishers & 
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